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I. GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND EMERGING ECONOMIES 
Globalization has given rise to a new era of international competition 
that is best understood by looking at the global organization of industries 
and the ways in which countries rise and fall within these industries.1  The 
global value chain (GVC) framework has evolved from its academic 
origins to become a major paradigm used by a wide range of international 
organizations, such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID).  Using core concepts like 
“governance” and “upgrading,” GVCs highlight the ways in which new 
patterns of international trade, production, and employment shape 
prospects for development and competitiveness.  
GVC analysis documents the international expansion and geographic 
fragmentation of contemporary production networks and focuses primarily 
on the issues of industry (re)organization, coordination, governance, and 
power in the chain.2  Its concern is to understand the causes and 
consequences of the organizational reconfiguration taking place in global 
industries.3  The GVC approach also explores the broader institutional 
context of these linkages, including trade policy, regulation, and standards. 
In the past two decades, profound changes in the structure of the 
global economy have reshaped global production and trade and have 
altered the organization of industries and national economies.4  As supply 
chains become global in scope, more intermediate goods are being traded 
across borders, and more imported parts and components are being 
integrated into exports.5  In 2009, world exports of intermediate goods 
exceeded the combined export values of final and capital goods for the first 
time, representing 51% of non-fuel merchandise exports.6  Because of the 
 
 1.  Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains and International Competition, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 37, 
37 (2011). 
 2.  Id. at 39. 
 3.  The seminal publication is COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Gary Gereffi & 
Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) (applying the global commodity chains concept for the first time to a 
broad range of contemporary industries).  In the early 2000s, the global commodity chains research 
agenda helped to spawn the closely related global value chain and global production network 
approaches.  Jennifer Bair, Global Commodity Chains: Genealogy and Review, in FRONTIERS OF 
COMMODITY CHAIN RESEARCH 2–14 (Jennifer Bair ed., 2009). 
 4.  Gary Gereffi & Timothy Sturgeon, Global Value Chains and Industrial Policy: The Role of 
Emerging Economies, in GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A CHANGING WORLD 329, 329 (Deborah K. Elms 
& Patrick Low eds., 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/aid4tradeglobal 
value13_e.pdf. 
 5.  Id.; see also Robert C. Feenstra, Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the 
Global Economy, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 31, 39–40. 
 6.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329; see also WORLD TRADE ORG. & INST. OF 
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unique ability of the GVC framework to show how international supply 
chains link economic activities at global, regional, national, and local levels 
within particular industries, international organizations such as the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World 
Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) are utilizing the GVC approach to 
structure new donor initiatives and data collection programs on global trade 
and development.7 
Emerging economies are playing significant and diverse roles in 
GVCs.8  During the 2000s, they became major exporters of intermediate 
and final manufactured goods (China, South Korea, and Mexico) and 
primary products (Brazil, Russia, and South Africa).  However, market 
growth in emerging economies has also led to shifting end markets in 
GVCs, as more trade has occurred between developing economies (often 
referred to as South-South trade in the literature), especially since the 
2008–09 economic recession.9  China has been the focal point of both 
trends: it is the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods and the 
world’s largest importer of many raw materials, thereby contributing to the 
primary product export boom. 
II. THE RISE OF GVCS 
In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. retailers and brand-name companies 
joined manufacturers in the search for offshore suppliers of most categories 
of consumer goods, which led to a fundamental shift from what had been 
“producer-driven” commodity chains, which include capital- and 
technology-intensive industries like automobiles and electronics, to “buyer-
 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES-JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., TRADE PATTERNS AND GLOBAL VALUE 
CHAINS IN EAST ASIA: FROM TRADE IN GOODS TO TRADE IN TASKS 81 (2011) [hereinafter WTO & 
IDE-JETRO], available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Press/ pdf/20110606_news.pdf. 
 7.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329; see, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade & 
Dev. [UNCTAD], Global Value Chains and Development: Investment and Value Added Trade in the 
Global Economy: A Preliminary Analysis, UNCTAD Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/2013/1 (Feb. 27, 2013), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diae2013d1_en.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., INTERCONNECTED ECONOMIES: BENEFITING FROM GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 
(2013), available at http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/10157/46174/Interconnected_ 
economies.pdf; THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS IN A POSTCRISIS WORLD: A 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi & Cornelia Staritz eds., 2010), available 
at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8499-2; WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
ENABLING TRADE: VALUING GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES (2013), available at http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/WEF_SCT_EnablingTrade_Report_2013.pdf. 
 8.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 351. 
 9.  Id.; see also Cornelia Staritz et al., Editorial, 4 INT’L J. TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING, 
INNOVATION & DEV. 1, 1–11 (2011) (analyzing multiple industry and country cases of shifting end 
markets and South-South trade in GVCs). 
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driven” chains, which include a broad range of consumer products like 
apparel, footwear, toys, and sporting goods.10  The geography of these 
chains expanded from regional production-sharing arrangements to full-
fledged global supply chains, with a growing emphasis on East Asia.11  In 
the 1960s and 1970s, large, vertically integrated transnational corporations 
dominated the landscape in most international industries,12 and the 
prevailing development strategy was import-substituting industrialization 
(ISI).  Well established in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Asia 
since the 1950s, ISI was a state-led effort to build domestic industries by 
requiring foreign manufacturers to replace imports with locally-made 
products, beginning with the assembly of final goods and working back to 
key components, in return for guaranteed market access.13  These domestic 
industrial policies were intended to nurture a set of full-blown national 
industries in key sectors that could significantly reduce, if not fully 
eliminate, imports from the industrialized nations.14 
The death knell for ISI, especially in Latin America, came from the oil 
shock of the late 1970s and the severe debt crisis that followed it.15  The ISI 
approach was creating large and persistent trade deficits because the 
manufacturing sectors in ISI countries were simply importing intermediate 
goods rather than reducing imports altogether, and escalating debt service 
payments led to a net outflow of foreign capital that crippled economic 
growth in the 1980s. 
 
 10.  Gary Gereffi, Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World, 21 REV. INT’L 
POL. ECON. 9, 10 (2014). 
 11.  Id.; see also Gary Gereffi, Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia, 
12 J. ASIAN BUS. 75 (1996) (describing the distinct roles played by Japan and the East Asian “tigers”—
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—in the development of East Asia’s export-oriented 
development model); Gary Gereffi, The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How 
U.S. Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks, in COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL 
CAPITALISM 95 (Gary Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) [hereinafter The Organization of 
Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains] (introducing the classic typology of buyer-driven and 
producer-driven commodity chains). 
 12.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 10; see also RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE 
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 7–18 (1971) (offering the first systematic empirical 
study of multinational enterprises in the post-war era). 
 13.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 10; see also Gary Gereffi, The International Economy and 
Economic Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 160, 211–12, 215–16 (Neil J. 
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (identifying the key features distinguishing Latin American 
and East Asian ISI and EOI development strategies). 
 14.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329–30. 
 15.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 11; see also Victor L. Urquidi, The Prospects for Economic 
Transformation in Latin America: Opportunities and Resistances, LATIN AM. STUD. ASS’N F., Fall 
1991, at 1, 3 (discussing the rise in interest rates for loans to Latin American governments, which 
undermined their ability to deal with the accumulated trade deficits caused by ISI policies). 
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Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, many developing countries made the transition from ISI to 
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) during the 1980s.16  This new 
outward-oriented development model focused on exports to the global 
market by local firms, and it removed the state requirement that foreign 
firms had to produce for protected domestic markets, which had mainly 
benefitted larger developing economies.17  There was an equally profound 
reorientation in the strategies of transnational corporations.  The rapid 
expansion of industrial capabilities and export propensities in a diverse 
array of newly industrializing economies in Asia and Latin America 
encouraged transnational companies to accelerate their own efforts to 
outsource relatively standardized activities to lower-cost production 
locations worldwide.  Precisely this change in the strategies of transnational 
companies enabled the shift from ISI to EOI in developing economies, and 
it corresponds with the shift from producer-driven to buyer-driven 
commodity chains at the level of global industries.18 
The rise of GVCs occurred in a period of falling trade barriers, the 
emergence of the WTO, and the policy prescriptions associated with the 
“Washington Consensus”—i.e., that governments had only to provide a 
strong set of “horizontal” policies (such as education, infrastructure, and 
macroeconomic stability) and be open to trade in order to succeed.19  Of 
course, many observers noted that the dynamic emerging economies did 
much more than establish a set of economy-wide enabling institutions for 
growth.  They frequently also targeted key domestic industries for support, 
under either ISI or EOI policies that tended to alternate over time in both 
Latin American and East Asian nations.20 
Today, industrial policy is on the upswing.21  WTO accession often 
comes with allowances for selective industrial policies (e.g., trade 
 
 16.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 11; see also Gary Gereffi, Paths of Industrialization: An Overview, 
in MANUFACTURING MIRACLES: PATHS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 3 
(Gary Gereffi & Donald L. Wyman eds., 1990) (reviewing the determinants and timing of different 
types of ISI and EOI in Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan). 
 17.  Gereffi, supra note 13, at 215–19. 
 18.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 11; see also Gereffi, supra note 11, at 97–99 (comparing buyer-
driven and producer-driven commodity chains). 
 19.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 329. 
 20.  Id.; see also Richard Baldwin, Trade and Industrialisation After Globalisation’s 2nd 
Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters 6 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17716, 2011), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17716.pdf (arguing that successful industrialization before 1985 meant 
building a domestic supply chain, in contrast to the subsequent emphasis in export-oriented economies 
on using offshore production to “join” global supply chains). 
 21.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 330. 
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promotion, local content rules, taxes, tariffs, and more indirect programs 
that drive local production) to remain in force for specified periods.  
Bilateral trade agreements can supersede such allowances under WTO 
rules, and a handful of relatively large and advanced emerging economies 
(such as those in the G-20) that have more clout in the institutions of global 
governance are using them to create policy space to design and implement 
activist industrial policies. 
The organization of global industries into GVCs in which production 
and trade networks are spread across many countries and regions has 
reinvigorated industrial policy debates.  There is not likely to be a return to 
the ISI and EOI policies of old.  Domestic industries in both industrialized 
and developing countries no longer stand alone, competing mainly through 
arm’s length trade.  Instead, they have become deeply intertwined through 
complex, overlapping business networks created through recurrent waves 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and global sourcing.  Companies, 
localities, and entire countries have come to occupy specialized niches 
within GVCs.  Because of this, today’s industrial policies have a different 
character and generate different outcomes than before.  Intentionally or not, 
governments currently engage in GVC-oriented industrialization when 
targeting key sectors for growth. 
New governance structures reinforce the organizational consolidation 
occurring within GVCs and the geographic concentration associated with 
the growing prominence of emerging economies as key economic and 
political actors.22  After 1989, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the opening 
of China to international investment and trade, and the liberalization of 
India brought a number of very large economies onto the global stage, 
known initially as BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).  The rise of the 
BRICs spurred the globalization process, as GVCs began to focus their 
investment and sourcing operations in big and dynamic emerging 
economies that offered abundant raw materials, large pools of low-wage 
workers, highly capable manufacturers, and rapidly growing domestic 
markets. 
Faced with slow growth at home, large lead firms in GVCs rushed to 
set up operations in BRIC countries, especially China, in an effort to carve 
out brand recognition and market share in rapidly expanding consumer 
markets and to cut costs on goods produced for export back to home 
markets.23  In producer-driven chains, the lead firms that to a large degree 
defined the structure of these industries were largely global manufacturers 
 
 22.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 15. 
 23.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 331. 
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like General Motors, Ford, IBM, and HP.24  In buyer-driven chains, the 
lead firms were a mix of retailers (like Walmart, JCPenney, and Carrefour), 
global marketers (such as Nike, Liz Claiborne, and Polo Ralph Lauren), 
and supermarkets and food multinationals (like Tesco and Nestlé).25  The 
lead firms in buyer-driven chains were particularly influential in the 
globalization process because they accelerated the process of “global 
sourcing” based on orders from developed countries, which relied almost 
entirely on production carried out in developing economies.26 
As retailers and branded manufacturers in wealthy countries became 
more experienced with global sourcing, developing countries enhanced 
their infrastructure, and suppliers in those countries upgraded their 
capabilities in response to larger orders for more complex goods.27  In the 
1990s, many U.S.- and Europe-based manufacturers quickly became huge 
global players, with facilities in scores of locations around the world (e.g., 
Siemens, Valeo, Flextronics).  A handful of elite East Asian suppliers (e.g., 
Pao Chen, Quanta, Foxconn) and trading companies (e.g., Li & Fung) also 
took on more tasks for multinational affiliates and global buyers.  These 
firms expanded production throughout Asia and more recently in Africa, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America. 
Lead firms themselves are getting bigger and increasing their global 
market shares through mergers, acquisitions, and the decline of many 
rivals.28  This has been coupled with a growing recognition of the strategic 
vulnerabilities of global supply chains: the risk of single-source 
relationships and the danger of lead firms losing access to critical inputs 
and raw material supplies.29  This is particularly apparent in the agrifoods 
sector, in which consumer goods firms such as Cadbury, Coca-Cola, and 
Unilever are expanding their direct involvement in the procurement and 
sustainability of the raw material sides of their value chains, such as those 
 
 24.  The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains, supra note 11, at 97. 
 25.  Id. at 97–99. 
 26.  See Gary Gereffi, International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity 
Chain, 48 J. INT’L ECON. 37, 44–49 (1999) (identifying retailers, branded marketers, and branded 
manufacturers as three types of “lead firms” engaged in global sourcing in buyer-driven commodity 
chains). 
 27.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 331; see also Gary G. Hamilton & Gary Gereffi, Global 
Commodity Chains, Market Makers, and the Rise of Demand-Responsive Economies, in FRONTIERS OF 
COMMODITY CHAIN RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 136, 153–59 (describing how U.S., European, and 
Japanese buyers worked with suppliers in South Korea and Taiwan to create the necessary conditions 
for expanding and diversifying exports of a broad array of consumer goods in both economies). 
 28.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 16. 
 29.  Id.; see also BARRY C. LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND COMING FALL OF THE 
GLOBAL CORPORATION 177–79, 211–15 (2005) (underscoring the vulnerability of companies and 
consumers to disruptions in global supply chains caused by both predictable and uncontrollable factors). 
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involving cocoa, coffee, and sugar.  This is also evident in the automobile 
and electronics industries, in which concern about the availability of raw 
materials such as lithium and coltan,30 respectively, are spurring greater 
engagement between GVC lead firms and host country suppliers and 
governments.  These examples suggest that a number of GVCs, especially 
in natural resource-based industries, are giving greater attention to strategic 
collaboration as a counterweight to the long-term trend toward 
specialization and fragmentation of supply chains. 
III. GOVERNANCE AND UPGRADING IN GVCS 
The GVC framework focuses on globally expanding supply chains 
and how value is created and captured therein.31  By analyzing the full 
range of activities that firms and workers perform to bring a specific 
product from its conception to its end use and beyond,32 the GVC approach 
provides a holistic view of global industries from two contrasting vantage 
points: top-down and bottom-up.33  The key concept for the top-down view 
is the “governance” of global value chains, which focuses mainly on lead 
firms and the organization of global industries; the main concept for the 
bottom-up perspective is “upgrading,” which focuses on the strategies used 
by countries, regions, and other economic stakeholders to maintain or 
improve their positions in the global economy.34 
The concept of governance is the centerpiece of GVC analysis.35  It 
examines the ways in which corporate power can actively shape the 
distribution of profits and risk in an industry and the actors who exercise 
such power through their activities.  Power in GVCs is exerted by lead 
firms.  In the governance typology outlined in Figure 1, the market and 
hierarchy poles of the GVC governance continuum are driven by price and 
ownership within vertically integrated firms, respectively.36  The remaining 
three categories are stable forms of network governance (modular, 
 
 30.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 16; see also DEV NATHAN & SANDIP SARKAR, BLOOD ON YOUR 
MOBILE PHONE? CAPTURING THE GAINS FOR ARTISANAL MINERS, POOR WORKERS AND WOMEN 2 
(Capturing the Gains, Briefing Note 2, 2011), available at http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg_ 
briefing_note_2.pdf (documenting the labor abuses endemic to coltan mining in Africa). 
 31.  Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares About Global Supply Chains, 
48 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24, 25 (2012). 
 32.  Id.; see also, e.g., Karina Fernandez-Stark, Penny Bamber & Gary Gereffi, The Offshore 
Services Value Chain: Upgrading Trajectories in Developing Countries, 4 INT’L J. TECHNOLOGICAL 
LEARNING, INNOVATION & DEV. 206, 209–11 (2011). 
 33.  Gereffi, supra note 1, at 39. 
 34.  Id. at 39–40. 
 35.  Gereffi & Lee, supra note 31, at 25. 
 36.  See infra Figure 1. 
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relational, and captive), in which different kinds of GVC lead firms control 
to a large degree the ways in which global supply chains operate and the 
main winners and losers within these chains. 
While governance issues have attracted a good deal of attention 
among GVC scholars, the research on economic upgrading has been at 
least as important because many of the people who use the GVC 
framework have a very strong development focus.37  “Economic 
upgrading” is defined as the process by which economic actors—firms and 
workers—move from low-value to relatively high-value activities in 
GVCs.38  The challenge of economic upgrading in GVCs is to identify the 
conditions under which developing and developed countries and firms can 
“climb the value chain” from basic assembly activities using low-cost and 
unskilled labor to more advanced forms of “full package” supply and 
integrated manufacturing.39 
IV. CONNECTING GVCS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
GVCs matter for economic development in several ways, since the 
ability of countries to prosper depends on their participation in the global 
economy, which is largely a story about their role in GVCs.40  Connecting 
countries to GVCs involves both investment and trade, which both rely 
heavily on efficient global supply chains in order to contribute to growth.41  
A key factor in such efficiency is infrastructure development, which 
enables global trade though the construction and improvement of the 
physical facilities that link national economies: ports and canals, airports, 
roads, and a wide range of information and communication technologies.42  
Improving trade flows at the border can be enhanced by infrastructure 
investments inside the border (i.e., in roads and facilities that connect rural 
regions and small firms to larger domestic markets) and also by 
investments beyond the border, especially in infrastructure facilities that 
connect a country to its nearby neighbors in regional supply chains.43  
 
 37.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 9. 
 38.  Gary Gereffi, The Global Economy: Organization, Governance, and Development, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 160, 171 (N.J. Smelser & R. Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
 39.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 10. 
 40.  Gereffi & Lee, supra note 25, at 24. 
 41.  See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 7, at 13 (demonstrating that reducing supply chain 
barriers to trade could increase gross domestic product up to six times more than could removing 
tariffs). 
 42.  PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: MAPPING THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 400–06 (6th ed. 2011); WTO & IDE-JETRO, supra note 6, at 28, 30. 
 43.  Frederick Mayer & William Milberg, Aid for Trade in a World of Global Value Chains: 
Chain Power, the Distribution of Rents, and Implications for the Form of Aid 9–10 (Capturing the 
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These regional markets are often underappreciated because of the 
importance given to developed country markets in the 1990s and early 
2000s, but in the current era, regional value chains are becoming a new 
focus for investment planning by development banks and international 
organizations.44 
GVC studies are pervasive in academic publications that examine a 
wide range of global industries.45  The framework has also been adopted by 
many of the most important international organizations concerned with 
economic development, such as the WTO, UNCTAD, the OECD, the 
World Bank, and the World Economic Forum.46  The international 
institutions that have provided the underpinning for the Washington 
Consensus (such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO) and major 
bilateral donors (such as USAID and the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID)) have embraced new models of 
development thinking, with an emphasis on sectoral analysis that links 
macro issues such as international trade and investment more closely with 
the micro development issues of employment, gender dynamics, and 
sustainable livelihoods.47  In addition, new alliances have emerged among 
diverse UN and other international agencies (such as the World Bank and 
the ILO) to promote joint research agendas that explore the links between 
economic and social upgrading, explicitly using the GVC framework.48 
This is an area in which GVC analysis and supply chain management 
research can be mutually beneficial.49  Sophisticated value chain data 
disaggregated by business functions can complement existing country-level 
trade statistics and industry-level input-output data, providing a clear 
 
Gains, Working Paper 34, 2013), available at http://www.capturingthegains.org/publications/working 
papers/wp_201334.htm. 
 44.  Gereffi & Lee, supra note 62, at 28–29. 
 45.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 23. 
 46.  Id.; see also supra notes 6–7. 
 47.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 23; see also, e.g., MAKING VALUE CHAINS WORK BETTER FOR THE 
POOR: A TOOLBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS OF VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS 1–4 (Tim Purcell et al. eds., 
2008), available at http://aciar.gov.au/publication/cop019 (providing a better understanding of how 
markets work, using the principles of value chain analysis); GENDER DEV. UNIT, INT’L TRADE DEV., 
THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, ECONOMIC UPGRADING, AND GENDER: CASE STUDIES OF 
THE HORTICULTURE, TOURISM, AND CALL CENTER INDUSTRIES 1–9 (Cornelia Staritz & José Guilherme 
Reis eds., 2013) (conducting a gendered analysis of the horticulture, tourism, and call center GVCs in 
Honduras, Kenya, and Egypt, respectively). 
 48.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 23; see also, e.g., INT’L LAB. ORG., TOWARDS BETTER WORK: 
UNDERSTANDING LABOUR IN APPAREL GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS (Arianna Rossi et al. eds., 2014); 
Stephanie Barrientos, Gary Gereffi & Arianna Rossi, Economic and Social Upgrading in Global 
Production Networks: A New Paradigm for a Changing World, 150 INT’L LAB. REV. 319 (2011). 
 49.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 21. 
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picture of who is gaining and losing in GVCs.50  When combined with data 
on employment, they will greatly advance our understanding of both 
economic and social development opportunities in the global economy. 
V. GVCS AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
Today virtually all major bilateral and multilateral donor agencies use 
value chain analysis as an instrument of private sector development.51  
There are two principal reasons for the increasing popularity of the GVC 
approach within the international donor community since the end of the 
1990s: first, the accumulating evidence of a link between economic growth 
driven by the private sector and poverty reduction; and second, the fact that 
global integration of trade and production through GVCs transmits the 
pressures of global competition to domestic markets in developing 
economies, leaving less space for local firms to design, produce, and 
market on their own.52  Given the pervasiveness of GVCs, the challenge is 
to design patterns of GVC engagement that balance both competitiveness 
and equity objectives while simultaneously generating jobs, higher 
productivity, and expanded output.53 
There is no simple way to connect GVC analysis to private sector 
development, since the firms in a value chain range from transnational 
corporations to microenterprises and since the institutional context and 
geographic scope of value chains vary enormously.54  Generally, however, 
donor interventions have four objectives: strengthening the weakest link to 
address potential bottlenecks; improving flows of knowledge and resources 
to make all firms in the chain more productive; working on specific links 
between firms to improve efficiency; and creating new or alternate links in 
the chain to promote diversified outcomes.55 
Much of this research and theoretical work has focused on how lead 
 
 50.  Id.; see also Timothy Sturgeon & Gary Gereffi, Measuring Success in the Global Economy: 
International Trade, Industrial Upgrading, and Business Function Outsourcing in Global Value 
Chains, TRANSNAT’L CORPS., Aug. 2009, at 1, 19 (illustrating how business functions can be integrated 
into GVC analysis, using a new typology and country survey data). 
 51.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 18. 
 52.  Id.; see also TILMAN ALTENBURG, THE DONOR COMM. FOR ENTER. DEV., DONOR 
APPROACHES TO SUPPORTING PRO-POOR VALUE CHAINS 4 (rev. ed. 2007), available at 
www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/ resource_en_162916.pdf. 
 53.  ALTENBURG, supra note 52, at 4. 
 54.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 26. 
 55.  Id.; see also JOHN HUMPHREY & LIZBETH NAVAS-ALEMÁN, INST. OF DEV. STUDIES, 
RESEARCH REPORT 63, VALUE CHAINS, DONOR INTERVENTIONS AND POVERTY REDUCTION: A REVIEW 
OF DONOR PRACTICE 20–22 (2010). 
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firms in specific GVCs have driven this process in various ways.56  
Decisions about outsourcing and offshoring are, after all, strategic 
calculations made by managers.  But such decisions are not made in a 
vacuum.  The policies and programs of countries and multilateral 
institutions set the context for corporate decision-making, and there has 
been an evolution in the form and effects of industrial policy along with the 
evolution of the business networks that comprise GVCs. 
Today the organization of the global economy is entering a new 
phase—what some have referred to as a “major inflection point”57—that 
could have dramatic implications for firms and workers in emerging and 
industrialized countries.  As world trade rebounds from the 2008–09 
economic crisis, emerging economies have become a major engine of 
growth. 
VI. THE HETEROGENEITY OF EMERGING ECONOMIES AND 
THEIR EXPORT PROFILES 
Focusing on a set of seven contemporary emerging economies—
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, and South Africa—will 
give a broader sense of the role of GVCs and development policies in the 
developing world.  They are all centrally involved in distinct types of 
GVCs in agriculture, extractive industries (mining, oil, and gas), 
manufacturing, and services.58  Together, these seven emerging economies 
account for 45% of the world’s population, 21% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), and 25% of global exports, and their GDP growth rates are 
substantially higher than the world average (3.4% versus 3.0%).59  The 
economic and social characteristics of these countries are quite diverse, 
however.  The specific roles of these countries in the global economy vary 
according to their openness to trade and foreign investment; their 
endowments of natural, human, and technological resources; their 
geopolitical relationships to the world’s most powerful countries; and the 
characteristics of their immediate neighbors. 
Although collectively these seven nations have considerable economic 
clout, China is the global pacesetter of the group.60  While China and India 
 
 56.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 332. 
 57.  Id.; see also Victor K. Fung, Chairman, Fung Global Inst., Speech to the Executive 
Committee of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry: Global Supply Chains – 
Past Developments, Emerging Trends (Oct. 11, 2011),  available at http://www.fungglobalinstitute.org/ 
en/global-supply-chains-%E2%80%93-past-developments-emerging-trends. 
 58.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 333. 
 59.  Id.; see infra Table 1. 
 60.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335. 
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are the most populous countries in the world, with 1.35 and 1.24 billion 
inhabitants, respectively, China is the undisputed export leader, with $2.0 
trillion in exports in 2012.61  China’s export total is greater than that of 
South Korea, Russia, India, Brazil, and Mexico combined ($1.9 billion), 
and its GDP has grown by over 9% per year for over 30 years.62  It is now 
the second-largest economy in the world (after only the United States) and 
has overtaken Germany as the world’s largest exporter.63  Notwithstanding 
its rapid economic growth, however, its GDP per capita was the second-
lowest among these emerging economies in 2012 ($6,090), well ahead of 
India’s ($1,489) but less than two-thirds that of Brazil ($11,322) and Russia 
($13,993) and just over one-quarter that of South Korea ($22,600).64  On 
average, the GDP per capita of these seven emerging economies was about 
20% above the world average in 2012.65 
The export profiles of these emerging economies indicate the roles 
that they play in GVCs.  Using a classification scheme that categorizes 
traded goods according to primary products plus four types of 
manufactured exports (resource-based, low-tech, medium-tech, and high-
tech),66 Table 2 highlights some of the differences between the export 
profiles of these countries.  Three of the emerging economies are heavily 
oriented toward primary product or resource-based exports: Russia (83%), 
Brazil (67%), and South Africa (55%).67  Half of India’s exports are 
resource oriented, and another 42% are low-tech (primarily apparel 
products) and medium-tech manufactured goods.68  China, South Korea, 
and Mexico, by contrast, are heavily involved in manufacturing GVCs.  
About 90% of China’s exports are manufactured goods, while a 
 
 61.  Id.; see infra Table 1. 
 62.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 1. 
 63.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see also Andrea Beltramello et al., The Export 
Performance of Countries Within Global Value Chains (GVCs) 33 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 
Directorate for Sci., Tech. & Indus., OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Paper No. 
2012/02, 2012), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k9bh3gv6647.pdf? 
expires=1401142150&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=994DE30A9A0594EA54E5113595ED1875 
(documenting the suge in the export of high-technology products by emerging economies). 
 64.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 1. 
 65.  See infra Table 1. 
 66.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see also Sanjaya Lall, The Technological Structure 
and Performance of Developing Country Manufactured Exports, 1985–98, 28 OXFORD DEV. STUD. 337 
(2000) (providing such a scheme). 
 67.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 2. 
 68.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 2.  Lall’s categories only cover 
goods, however, and India is also the world leader in exports of offshore services, with 45% of the 
global total.  Lall, supra note 66, at 367; see also Fernandez-Stark, Bamber & Gereffi, supra note 32, at 
214 (defining and analyzing recent trends in the offshore services industry using a GVC approach). 
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preponderance of the exports of South Korea (72%) and Mexico (60%) are 
medium-tech (automotive, machinery) and high-tech (mainly electronics) 
exports.69 
VII. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN GVCS 
Industrial policies that take the new realities of GVCs into account 
include traditional measures to regulate links to the global economy, 
especially the regulation of trade, foreign direct investment, and the 
exchange rates used in ISI and EOI policies that sought to elevate the 
position of “national champions.”70  Today, GVC-oriented industrial policy 
focuses to a greater extent than in the past on the intersection of global and 
local actors, and it takes the interests, power, and reach of lead firms and 
global suppliers into account, accepts international (and increasingly 
regional) business networks as the appropriate field of play, and responds 
to pressures from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).71 
There are three distinguishable types of industrial policies: 
“horizontal” policies that affect the entire national economy; “selective” (or 
“vertical”) industrial policies targeted at particular industries or sectors; and 
GVC-oriented industrial policies that leverage international supply chain 
linkages or dynamics to improve a country’s role in global or regional 
value chains.72  “Horizontal” policies focus on the basic building blocks of 
competitive national economies, such as education, health, infrastructure, 
and R&D expenditures.73  Although these areas all provide attractive 
opportunities for private investors, the public sector typically plays a role in 
providing widespread access to these factors as public goods.  Domestic 
industrial policies tend to be “selective” or “vertical” because they are 
associated with prioritizing particular industries or activities at the national 
level.  GVC-oriented industrial policies go beyond the domestic economic 
focus of ISI-style policy regimes, which try to recreate entire supply chains 
within a national territory.  Given the expansion of international production 
networks associated with GVCs, this new type of industrial policy 
explicitly utilizes extraterritorial linkages that affect a country’s positioning 
in global or regional value chains. 
Current examples of GVC-oriented industrial policies include efforts 
to create and sustain regional supply chains that provide inputs, such as the 
 
 69.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 335; see infra Table 2. 
 70.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 338; see also Baldwin, supra note 20, at 30–31 (detailing 
the policy challenges confronted by newly industrializing states). 
 71.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 336. 
 72.  Id. at 342–43. 
 73.  Id. at 342. 
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East Asian components that have been incorporated into China’s 
smartphone exports, that are needed for national export success.74  Case 
studies in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa describe efforts to 
create regional integration arrangements that could strengthen the export 
position of countries in each region by sourcing inputs from regional 
neighbors (e.g., textiles and apparel in Central America or sub-Saharan 
Africa and minerals processing in sub-Saharan Africa).  The case of 
Brazil’s efforts to upgrade via GVC-oriented industrial policies is 
examined in a bit more detail below. 
VIII. THE PRIMARY PRODUCT BATTLEGROUND: BRAZIL’S 
SOYBEAN EXPORTS TO CHINA 
Large emerging economies that supply primary products to China face 
a major challenge: finding ways to increase the technological content of 
their exports in order to move into higher value activities.  This has been a 
vexing issue for Brazil, as China accounted for about 15% of its exports 
and imports in 2010.75  From a GVC perspective, the pattern of Brazil’s 
exports to China is notably skewed toward products (both primary 
commodities and manufactured goods) with very low levels of 
processing.76 
The soybean value chain is a good example.  About 95% of Brazil’s 
soybean exports to China in 2009 were unprocessed beans; there were 
virtually no exports of soybean meal, flour, or oil to China.77  To pursue its 
strategy of promoting the Chinese soybean processing industry, China had 
imposed a tariff of 9% on soybean oil imports, while the tariff on 
unprocessed soybean imports was only 3%.78  There was also a higher 
value-added tax rate in China on imports of products based on processed 
soybeans than on unprocessed beans.79  Similar protectionist policies, 
including both tariff and non-tariff barriers, have been imposed by the 
Chinese government on other primary and processed intermediate products 
from Brazil, including leather, iron and steel, and pulp and paper.80 
On the import side, Brazil has also been influenced by China’s 
structure of international trade.  In 1996, low-tech products accounted for 
 
 74.  Id. at 343. 
 75.  Rhys Jenkins, China and Brazil: Economic Impacts of a Growing Relationship, 41 J. 
CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 21, 22 (2012). 
 76.  Id. at 28. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 29. 
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40% of Brazil’s imports from China, while high-tech products accounted 
for 25%.81  By 2009, the pattern was nearly reversed: high-tech products 
were 41.4% of the total, and low-tech products were 20.8%.82  In terms of 
the end use of imports, Brazilian consumer goods imports from China fell 
from 44% to 16% between 1996 and 2009, while Brazilian imports of 
capital goods more than doubled from 12% to 25%, and parts for capital 
goods rose from 12% to 25%.83  Thus, Brazil has fallen to the lowest rungs 
of the value-added ladder in its trade with China in recent decades. 
While the trade relationship with China is the most severe challenge 
for Brazil, the problem is more pervasive.84  For example, Embraer, a 
successful Brazilian producer of regional passenger aircraft, depends on 
imports for 100% of its aircraft-grade aluminum, despite Brazil’s 
abundance of the aluminum ore (bauxite) and rare minerals required for 
aircraft-grade alloys.  South Africa has had some success in this regard.  It 
is the largest exporter of catalytic converters for use in vehicle exhaust 
systems, products that rely on platinum, a precious metal that is abundant 
in South Africa. 
IX. INFRASTRUCTURE GROWTH IN ELECTRONICS: FOXCONN IN 
BRAZIL 
Brazil’s recent efforts to leverage its large and dynamic internal 
market to build domestic capabilities in the consumer electronics sector are 
instructive of how GVCs intersect with national industrial policies.  A 
growing middle class in Brazil has begun to demand consumer electronics 
on an unprecedented scale.85  Sales of smartphones and other Internet-
connected mobile devices are expected to increase dramatically with 
Brazil’s hosting of the World Cup soccer championship in 2014 and the 
Olympic Summer Games in 2016, and this will drive huge investments in 
equipment to upgrade Brazil’s already strained infrastructure for voice 
connectivity and data communications. 
Thanks to Brazil’s GVC-oriented industrial policies and direct 
pressure on the company from policymakers, Foxconn has begun to 
assemble iPhones, iPads, and, most recently, iPad minis for Apple in 
Brazil.86  While Foxconn is more vertically integrated than most electronics 
 
 81.  Id. at 29–30. 
 82.  Id. at 30. 
 83.  Id. at 31. 
 84.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 345. 
 85.  Id. at 346. 
 86.  Id. at 350. 
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manufacturing services firms, it is likely to begin to manufacture 
components, including displays, in Brazil.  Recent negotiations for a fifth 
Foxconn factory in Brazil have included language to suggest that once 
production is at 100% (projected to be 2016), Foxconn will be 
manufacturing components including cables, cameras, touch-sensor glass, 
LED products, and printed-circuit boards.87 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) uses three global contract manufacturers in 
Brazil (Foxconn, Flextronics, and Jabil Circuit).  Their products include 
computers, desktop and notebook PCs, workstations, computer servers, and 
single- and multi-function printers.  Local production accounts for 95% of 
HP’s local sales.  HP imports low-volume products, such as large-format 
printers, high-end servers, and some high-end portable computers, and 
makes printer ink cartridges in its own plant using a proprietary 
manufacturing process.  Most components are imported, except RFID chips 
for printer cartridges, which are developed by CEITEC, a local 
government-supported semiconductor foundry. 
The presence of global contract manufacturers in Brazil creates a 
number of immediate advantages.  The most obvious is jobs.  For example, 
Foxconn currently employs 6000 people in Brazil and could add 10,000 
more jobs by 2016.88  Additionally, because contract manufacturers serve 
multiple customers, their manufacturing capabilities can satisfy local 
content requirements for multiple brands.  Production capacity is generic 
and flexible enough to effectively pool capacity across all high-volume 
segments of the electronics industry, and capacity can be switched to 
accommodate product categories and firms that are successful in the local 
and the export market.  The focus of Brazil’s GVC-oriented industrial 
policy—attracting investments by contract manufacturers and GVC lead 
firms—signals a sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of the 
electronics GVCs by policymakers.  Contract manufacturers provide a 
leading-edge, flexible, and scalable platform for local production and 
R&D.  Lead firms like Apple and HP tend to use the same contractors on a 
global basis, and their presence in Brazil lowers the bar for localization. 
X. BEYOND “PICKING WINNERS” IN BRAZIL 
As the Brazil consumer electronics case suggests, the formation of 
industrial policy need not involve policymakers “picking” growth 
 
 87.  Id.; see also Lisa Wang, Foxconn Invests More in Brazil, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, at 13, 
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2012/09/20/2003543171. 
 88.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 351; see also Lorraine Luk, Foxconn to Build Fifth 
Brazil Plant, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2012, 6:06 AM ET, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963 
90444165804578005722309270246.html. 
GEREFFI MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  10:01 PM 
450 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:433 
industries; rather, it could begin with attempts to improve the performance 
of existing industries.  This involves a search for mechanisms or activities 
that can capture investment and improve a country’s value-adding position 
in dynamic segments of GVCs that are in the process of spreading to new 
locations or that may already be present in the policymaker’s jurisdiction.89  
When Brazil’s policymakers try to capture more value added in local 
markets that are already growing rapidly, they are reinforcing success 
rather than picking winners. 
Of course, policymakers must also be concerned with increased prices 
caused by either market slowdowns or government-imposed import 
restrictions.  Broad economic growth is likely to be inhibited when markets 
for products that make the whole economy more efficient, such as smart 
phones, computers, and business services, are disrupted.  Presumably, 
policies that pressure lead firms to add more value locally can be modest 
and targeted enough that they do not impede market growth.  Once 
policymakers accept the proposition that a balanced approach is possible, 
the question then becomes how to most effectively craft GVC-oriented 
industrial policies. 
XI. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: MEXICO’S OPEN ECONOMY 
A major element of Mexico’s success is its very high degree of trade 
openness: it has free trade agreements with 44 countries, which is more 
than twice as many as China and four times as many as Brazil.90  
Additionally, while rising wages and fuel prices have made exporting from 
China to the United States market increasingly expensive, Mexico’s wages, 
which were nearly four times higher than China’s a decade ago, are just 
29% higher today.91  Also, while Mexico still has an abundance of cheap 
labor, as more than half of its population of 112 million is under the age of 
29, its workers are also becoming more skilled, with growing proportions 
of graduates in engineering, architecture, and other professions.92 
Mexico’s geographical proximity to the United States allows shorter 
supply chains, lower transport costs for bulky items, and quicker delivery 
times in the context of increasingly popular “fast fashion,” “just in time,” 
and other “rapid response” business models.93  As with China, Mexico is a 
 
 89.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 353. 
 90.  Adam Thomson, China’s Unlikely Challenger: Mexico, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, at 11. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Timothy Sturgeon, Gary Gereffi, Andrew Guinn & Ezequiel Zylberberg, O Brasil nas 
Cadeias Globais de Valor: Implicaçaões para a Politica Industrial e de Comércio [Brazil in Global 
Value Chains: Implications for Trade and Industrial Policy], REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE COMÉRCIO 
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platform for multinational enterprises (MNEs) seeking to locate labor-
intensive aspects of GVCs (including both manual and knowledge work) in 
a country that is both low-cost and close to the huge United States market.  
This should also create new project development options and finance 
opportunities for domestic and foreign-owned firms. 
XII. A NEW ROLE FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Upgrading national firms in this context is not an easy task.94  Because 
GVC lead firms encourage suppliers in different countries to compete with 
each other for orders, and lead firms often choose to work with the same 
global suppliers in multiple locations to reduce transaction costs, states tend 
to have less leverage to demand local content requirements or less scope to 
develop links to domestic suppliers.  In the face of such challenges, some 
large emerging economies are shifting their development strategies inward 
and relying more extensively on regional production networks buttressed 
by regional industrial policy. 
An alternative conception of regional integration strategies (including 
preferential trade agreements, economic cooperation arrangements, and 
regional production networks) could be based on supply-side strategies, 
rather than the traditional demand-side considerations that usually justify 
regional integration.95  The demand-side logic of regional integration 
highlights increases in market size, market access, and foreign direct 
investment to create more attractive import markets.  The supply-side 
approach would view regional integration as a necessary condition to create 
scale economies and complementarities that can drive more production and 
processing and thus higher value exports from the regions made up of small 
economies (e.g., the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement) or large ones (e.g., the North American Free Trade 
Agreement). 
XIII. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN LARGE AND SMALL 
ECONOMIES 
Large emerging economies have more options to upgrade within 
GVCs than small economies.  Large emerging economies can focus on 
manufactured exports, as China and Mexico have done since the mid-
1990s, but they can also reorient their productive capacity to serve 
 
EXTERIOR [R.B.C.E.], Apr.–June 2013, at 26, 31 (Braz.), translated at http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/ 
2013-05-22_Sturgeon_et_al_Funcex_article_submitted.pdf. 
 94.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 338. 
 95.  Id. at 339. 
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domestic demand if export markets become less attractive.  While both 
small and large countries can upgrade at the regional level by diversifying 
or adding new capabilities that are not available at the national level, large 
countries have more leverage in such arrangements.  Large countries with 
high potential for market growth (such as the BRICs) can also institute 
policies to drive FDI in technology- and capital-intensive sectors, such as 
electronics and motor vehicles. 
Small countries have fewer options.  Their market size is not big 
enough to attract FDI in the local market, and domestic firms tend to be 
small-scale and less advanced.  The regional organization of some GVCs, 
however, has created opportunities for smaller countries to leverage low 
costs and proximity to large markets to build export capacities in 
specialized GVC niches (e.g., intermediate goods) in the context of 
regional production systems.  Costa Rica, for example, has supply-side 
constraints related to productive capacity and skills and conceivably could 
partner with Mexico to enhance its training programs and skills 
development.  Nicaragua, whose apparel firms have been buying textiles 
from East Asia, would benefit from supply arrangements with textile firms 
in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.  In sum, specialization and 
regional GVC linkages matter for political and economic integration in a 
way that was not the case previously. 
Recently there is a growing concern in both developed and developing 
countries that the economic gains from participating in global supply 
chains do not necessarily translate into good jobs or stable employment and 
that, in the worst case, economic upgrading may be linked to a significant 
deterioration of labor conditions, or social downgrading.96  This raises the 
question of the extent to which global supply chains are “inclusive” or 
“exclusive” in their facilitation of the upgrading of lower-level firms in the 
chain.97  This kind of research will require the development of precise 
indicators of upgrading (economic, social, or environmental) that are 
relevant to supplier firms and the countries where they are located.  
Information about upgrading and downgrading outcomes will require 
interviews with firms across the supply chain to identify mechanisms and 
outcomes that address this issue, the use of quantitative measures to allow 
the development of empirical indicators for each variable, and appropriate 
generalizations from these findings. 
 
 96.  Gereffi & Lee, supra note 31, at 29; see also Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, supra note 48, at 
330–32 (arguing for the need to link economic and social upgrading). 
 97.  Gereffi & Lee, supra note 31, at 30. 
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XIV. POLICY CHALLENGES IN BRAZIL 
Like China, Brazil has a large internal market, allowing it to 
implement industrial policies that would be impossible for a smaller 
country (e.g., local content regulations and tax breaks).98  It also lies at the 
core of Mercosur, the regional trade pact that links Brazil to several other 
South American economies.  The question is: what sort of industrial 
policies make sense given the historical moment?  Should Brazil pursue 
policies of the past and seek to develop fully independent domestic 
industries separate from GVCs?  Should it pursue the same low-value-
added business functions that have driven growth in China and Mexico?  
Or should it seek to capture more of the new, higher-value-added functions 
that are being hived off into GVCs today? 
A dynamic, adaptive, and evidence-based policymaking process is 
called for in Brazil.  Chief among the challenges is the complexity and 
instability of the country’s industrial policy regime.99  Because policies 
change constantly, companies are having trouble projecting into the future.  
For example, executives at electronics firms in Brazil indicated that 
uncertainty related to rapidly shifting local production incentives 
(Processos Produtivos Básicos, or PPBs) and import tariff levels have been 
significant constraints to growth.  Such uncertainty tends to impact small 
and medium-size enterprises more significantly than large firms because 
small firms do not have clout with policymakers in Brazil. 
Policy uncertainty is just one of the many elements of what has come 
to be known as the “Brazil cost.”  The added costs associated with working 
in Brazil include poor infrastructure, excessive layers of bureaucracy, 
corruption, and high interest rates.  According to the World Bank’s “Doing 
Business 2013” rankings, Brazil ranks 130th in the world in ease of doing 
business, behind China and Russia, and it ranks 156th in ease of paying 
taxes.  Interviews with industry executives reflect the fact that while 
industrial policy interventions are needed, they will be for naught unless 
the broader issue of the “Brazil cost” is tackled as well.  Thus, while 
Brazil’s “Third Way Developmentalism” seeks to put foreign and domestic 
capital on the same footing, multinational firms unaccustomed to the 
market remain at a disadvantage. 
CONCLUSION 
Economic globalization is a byproduct of international production and 
trade networks organized by transnational firms, and it is embedded in 
 
 98.  Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 32. 
 99.  Id. at 37. 
GEREFFI MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2014  10:01 PM 
454 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:433 
various kinds of regulation, including rules of the game established by 
international institutions, national government policies, and various forms 
of private governance that non-state actors use to manage their activities in 
GVCs.100  Public governance will likely be called upon to play a stronger 
role in supplementing and reinforcing corporate codes of conduct, product 
certifications, process standards, and other voluntary, non-governmental 
types of private governance that have proliferated in the last two decades, 
and multi-stakeholder initiatives involving both public and private actors 
will arise to deal with collective action problems. 
The challenge will be to link economic and social upgrading of both 
material work conditions and the quantity and quality of jobs created in 
contemporary GVCs.101  For developing countries, the trade, investment, 
and knowledge flows that underpin GVCs provide mechanisms for rapid 
learning, innovation, and industrial upgrading.102  GVCs can provide local 
firms with better access to information, open up new markets, and create 
opportunities for fast technological learning and skill acquisition.  Because 
transactions and investments linked to GVCs typically come with quality 
control systems and prevailing global business standards that exceed those 
in developing countries, enterprises and individuals in developing countries 
can acquire new competencies and skills by participating in GVCs. 
Still, GVCs are not a panacea for development.  Very rapid or 
“compressed” GVC-driven development can create a host of new economic 
and social policy challenges in areas such as health care and education.103  
GVCs can create barriers to learning and drive uneven development over 
time, even as they trigger rapid industrial upgrading, because of the 
geographic and organizational disjunctures that often exist between 
innovation and production.  There is considerable evidence that greater 
profits accrue to those “lead firms” in the value chain that control branding 
and product conception (e.g., Apple) and to the “platform leaders” that 
provide core technologies and advanced components (e.g., Intel).  At the 
same time, contract manufacturers and business process outsourcing 
service providers (e.g., call centers) tend to earn slim profits and may never 
develop the autonomy or capabilities needed to develop and market their 
 
 100.  Gereffi, supra note 10, at 21; see also Frederick Mayer & Gary Gereffi, Regulation and 
Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, art. 11, at 
8 (2010) (formulating a set of propositions about the limited role of private governance in GVCs). 
 101.  Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, supra note 48, at 319, 322 (offering preliminary findings on 
economic and social upgrading). 
 102.  Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 33. 
 103.  Id.; see also D. Hugh Whittaker et al., Compressed Development, STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV., 
Dec. 2010, at 439 (identifying the distinct features of “compressed” development in the contemporary 
global economy). 
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own branded products.  Typically, firms that provide routine assembly 
tasks and other simple services within GVCs earn less, pay their workers 
less, and are more vulnerable to business cycles, not least because they are 
required to support large-scale employment and fixed capital.104 
Large multinational corporations tend to be the most important 
suppliers and service providers in GVCs, thus crowding out opportunities 
for local firms.105  If low-value-added activities dominate a specific country 
or region, then consequences for economic performance and social welfare 
can be profound.  Specifically, entrenchment in narrow, routine, low-value-
added activities can lock firms and national industries into unprofitable and 
intellectually narrow segments of the value chain.  Learning might be rapid 
at first, but over time such limits can become acute, especially if lead firms 
in GVCs move to new sites for low-cost production and more promising 
markets.106 
What is the role of policy in the current era?  Economic globalization 
is mainly an artifact of corporate strategy.  Top managers and corporate 
board members make decisions every day about what to invest in and 
where to invest.  Conceptually this seems simple enough, but firm activities 
frequently transcend national boundaries.  There is a growing mismatch 
between the activities of firms and the economies, policies, and politics of 
nation-states.  Domestic rules provide only one element in the fabric of 
global governance that large MNEs consider.107 
Several major features highlight the distinctive nature of GVC-
oriented industrial policies.  One is the role of global suppliers.  GVC-
oriented industrial policies require an increasingly sophisticated 
understanding of the global-scale patterns of industrial organization that 
have come to the fore in GVCs since at least the 1990s.108  Lead firms are 
relying on global suppliers and intermediaries for an array of processes, 
specialized inputs, and services, and they demand that their most important 
suppliers have a global presence.  Hence suppliers, not lead firms, are 
making many of the new investments that developing countries are seeking 
to capture.  In many cases, suppliers generate the bulk of exports as well.  
 
 104.  Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 33; see also Boy Lüthje, Electronics 
Contract Manufacturing: Global Production and the International Division of Labor in the Age of the 
Internet, 9 INDUS. & INNOVATION 227 (2002) (documenting the rise of network-based mass production 
in electronics manufacturing services). 
 105.  Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 34. 
 106.  Id.; see also John Humphrey & Hubert Schmitz, How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains 
Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?, 36 REGIONAL STUD. 1017 (2002). 
 107.  Sturgeon, Gereffi, Guinn & Zylberberg, supra note 93, at 33–34. 
 108.  Gereffi & Sturgeon, supra note 4, at 353. 
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The capability to serve multiple customers also takes on heightened 
importance.109  Thus, it is no accident that Brazil sought investments from 
Foxconn, rather than Apple, in its desire for iPhones and iPads to be 
produced in the country for domestic consumption and export elsewhere in 
Latin America. 
A second feature of industrial policies in the GVC era is global 
sourcing and value chain specialization.  Policies that promote linkages to 
GVCs have very different aims than traditional industrial policies that 
intend to build full-blown, vertically integrated domestic industries.  
Policies can target specialized niches in GVCs.  These can be higher-value 
niches suited to existing capabilities, or they can be generic capabilities 
pooled across foreign investors.  Either of these can serve both domestic 
and export markets.  This sort of value chain specialization assumes an 
ongoing dependence on imported inputs and services.  Global sourcing 
means that the entire value chain may never be captured, but it also assures 
ongoing involvement in leading-edge technologies, standards, and industry 
best practices. 
Third, firms in emerging economies like China and Brazil are seeking 
to move to the head of GVCs, regionally if not globally.  Encouraging 
global suppliers to establish facilities within a country has long-term 
advantages.  Local lead firms can rely on global suppliers in their midst and 
on broader GVCs for a wide range of inputs and services, from design to 
production to logistics to marketing and distribution.  This can lower risk 
and barriers to entry for local firms, provide access to capabilities and scale 
that far outstrip what is available domestically, and ensure that products 
and services are up to date. 
The use of industrial policies by emerging economy policymakers 
should not come as a big surprise.  Both developed and developing 
countries have deployed these policies in the past, often with considerable 
sophistication, as in the case of East Asian economies such as Japan, South 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and now China.  Looking towards the future, 
the traditional rulemaking and finance-oriented international organizations 
of the Washington Consensus era, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the 
World Bank, face the challenge of constructing a new global economic 
order that aligns with the shifting roles of both the emerging and developed 
economies.  A stable foundation for sustainable development will require 
both bold vision and a flexible pragmatism to guide a new generation of 
inclusive growth policies and institutional arrangements within the global 
economy. 
 
 109.  Id. at 354. 
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FIGURE 1: FIVE TYPES OF GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN 
GOVERNANCE110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. SEVEN SELECTED EMERGING ECONOMIES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 2012111 
 
 
 
 
 
 110.  Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 78, 
89 (2005). 
 111.  The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/; UN COMTRADE DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/; World 
Development Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/products/wdi. 
Agriculture Industry Services
China 1,351          $2,049 $8,227 $6,090 $9,083 7.8 10 45 45
South Korea 50                $548 $1,130 $22,600 $30,801 2.0 3 39 58
Russia 144              $525 $2,015 $13,993 $23,501 3.4 4 36 60
Mexico 115              $371 $1,115 $9,696 $16,734 3.8 4 36 61
India 1,237          $290 $1,842 $1,489 $3,813 3.2 17 26 57
Brazil 199              $243 $2,253 $11,322 $11,716 0.9 5 26 68
South Africa 51                $87 $384 $9,752 $11,255 2.5 3 28 69
Total or Avg. 3,147          $4,113 $16,966 $10,706 $15,272 3.4 7 33 61
World Total 7,095 $16,457 $84,970 $11,365 $12,700 3.0
% of World Total 45% 25% 21% 94% 120% 112%
Exports 
($Billions)²
Population 
(Millions)¹Country
Percent of GDP³GDP growth 
YoY (%)¹
GDP/capita 
(PPP)¹
GDP/capita 
(USD)¹
GDP 
($Billions)¹
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TABLE 2.  EXPORT PROFILES OF EMERGING ECONOMIES, 2000-
2012112 
 
 
 112.  UN COMTRADE DATABASE, supra note 111. 
Primary 
Products
Resource 
Based
Low-Tech
Medium-
Tech
High-
Tech
Primary 
Products
Resource 
Based
Low-Tech
Medium-
Tech
High-
Tech
China 2% 9% 31% 24% 33% 2049 722% -4 -1 -10 4 11
South Korea 1% 19% 9% 43% 27% 548 218% 0 7 -7 10 -9
Russia 53% 30% 2% 9% 1% 525 409% 12 5 -3 -3 -2
Mexico 17% 8% 9% 39% 23% 371 123% 5 3 -6 2 -6
India 12% 36% 23% 19% 8% 290 584% -2 8 -16 8 3
Brazil 48% 19% 5% 19% 5% 243 340% 24 -4 -7 -6 -8
South Africa 29% 26% 5% 27% 3% 87 230% 12 -4 -5 1 -1
*Exports totals do not include uncategorized exports, and therefore they may not equal 100%. Legend: x ≤ -6 -5 ≤ x < 0 0 ≤ x ≤ 9 x ≥ 10
Change in 
total export 
value,
2000-2012
Percentage point change in 
share of exports by sector, 2000-2012Share of exports by sector*
Total 
Export 
Value 
($Billions)
